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A Path to Peace: Thoughts on 
Olympic Revenue and the IOC/
USOC Divide
Tim Elcombe
Stephen Wenn
U.S. Public Law 95-606 (otherwise known as the Amateur Sports Act), passed in 1978, 
has contributed significantly to the relationship between the United States Olympic Com-
mittee (USOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for the past thirty years. 
Exclusive rights to the use of Olympic marks and emblems in the U.S. territory granted to 
it in the Amateur Sports Act were leveraged by the USOC to obtain amounts of Olympic-
generated revenue from the sale of television rights fees and major corporate sponsorships 
far larger than any of the other National Olympic Committees (NOCs) recognized by the 
IOC. This privileged financial position has become a divisive issue for the USOC, IOC, and 
the world’s 204 other NOCs. The IOC and USOC have agreed to commence discussions 
towards the establishment of a revised method to distribute Olympic revenue to members 
of the Olympic Tripartite (IOC, NOCs, and International Sport Federations). We suggest 
broadening this discussion to include a move to increase the amount of money from these 
sources transferred to Olympic Organizing Committees (OCOGs) to support a more for-
malized legacy plan for Olympic athletic facilities in host cities, and adding a new sponsor 
category to the existing corporate sponsorship program, The Olympic Partners (TOP), to 
enhance the IOC’s commitment to social responsibility and sustainability. We also propose 
a new formula for the distribution of Olympic television and corporate sponsorship revenue 
as a means of contributing to this dialogue that must target a mutually acceptable resolution 
in order to foster a more harmonious working relationship between the IOC and USOC.
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with a research emphasis on television rights negotiations and corporate sponsorship. 
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Introduction
In early 2011, the IOC is preparing to vote in July for the right to host the 2018 Olympic Winter Games, an honor chased by Annecy (France), 
Munich (Germany), and Pyeongchang (South Korea), and continues to li-
aise with British organizers during the crucial run up to the 2012 London 
Olympics. Both tasks are justifiably absorbing the attention of IOC officials; 
however, their energies are also being expended to solve a dispute concerning 
the distribution of Olympic revenue, which has compromised IOC/USOC 
relations in recent years. 
The dispute dates to the 1980s, when the USOC successfully lever-
aged its exclusive rights to the use of the Olympic rings in U.S. territory 
to secure sums of money from domestic Olympic television contracts and 
the revenue accrued by the Olympic Program (now The Olympic Partners, 
TOP), a worldwide corporate sponsorship program conceived by former 
IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch in order to diversify the Olympic 
Movement’s revenue base, that was both envied and resented by the world’s 
other NOCs, leaders of the International Sport Federations (ISFs), and IOC 
members based in Europe. The envy and resentment rose to such levels that 
the efforts of Chicago to acquire the right to host the 2016 Olympic Games 
were compromised. Recent productive dialogue between IOC executives and 
the USOC’s leadership tandem of Larry Probst and Scott Blackmun offers 
the possibility for an era of improved bilateral relations, but this desirable 
outcome hinges on identifying and enacting mutually acceptable changes 
to the current distribution of Olympic commercial revenue. 
In this paper, we offer our thoughts on how the IOC and USOC might 
approach the immediate need to reach an agreement (in advance of a 2013 
deadline), while also exploring means of improving financial support for 
Olympians from developing nations, enhancing the post-Olympic use of 
Olympic venues, and extending the Olympic Movement’s commitment to 
sustainability.
Background
In the 1970s, a widespread consensus existed in the United States that a 
dysfunctional managerial support structure compromised the efforts of the 
country’s athletes on the international stage, most notably in Olympic com-
petition. Soviet and East German athletes increasingly overshadowed U.S. 
Olympians in the 1960s and 1970s, and in a Cold War environment such a 
reality required redress. Washington lawmakers, who found their motivation 
to take action in the wake of the country’s poor showing at the 1972 Mu-
nich Olympics, targeted a solution for the internecine disputes between the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the Amateur Athletic 
Union (AAU), both of whom had long jockeyed for power and authority in 
U.S. Olympic matters. This rivalry was viewed as a major contributing factor 
to the malaise concerning U.S. Olympic fortunes. Passed by U.S. legislators 
in 1978, Public Law 95-606, more commonly known as the Amateur Sports 
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Act (ASA), reflected the government’s effort to streamline the administra-
tion of the nation’s Olympic affairs. 
The new administrative framework of the USOC, birthed by the ASA, 
resulted in the emasculation of the AAU, removing its national governing 
status for eight Olympic sports. This action placated the NCAA whose 
withdrawal from the U.S. Olympic scene in 1972 occurred as a result of its 
disenchantment with the AAU’s power. Authority of U.S. Olympic affairs 
was placed squarely under the auspices of the revamped USOC.1 While the 
USOC’s administrative structure required further renovation in ensuing 
years, and excessive turnover at the executive level plagued the organization 
in the last decade,2 the ASA (modified and rebranded as the Ted Stevens 
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act in 1998)3 confirmed the USOC’s control 
of Olympic-related decision making in the United States.
In 1978, few U.S. federal legislators were likely to have perceived the 
seeds of conflict they sowed between the USOC and the IOC. But in deliver-
ing peace to the U.S. Olympic 
community, Washington pol-
iticians established a second 
theater of conflict. American 
legislators granted the USOC 
the exclusive rights to the use 
of the Olympic five-ring logo 
and other related marks and 
emblems in U.S. territory.4 This decision occurred before the IOC attempted 
to secure exclusive ownership of the five-ring logo in the early 1980s, via 
the World Intellectual Property Organization,5 and preceded the IOC’s 
emergence as an economic juggernaut in the 1980s under Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, the IOC’s seventh President. As a result of the powers granted 
to the USOC under the legislation, the ASA has been a significant factor in 
shaping IOC/USOC relations since the early 1980s.6 
As the value of Olympic television rights climbed, and Samaranch’s 
plans for diversifying the IOC’s revenue base by establishing an international 
corporate sponsorship program evolved, the USOC soon grasped the eco-
nomic value of its domestic ownership of the Olympic rings. Negotiations 
between the IOC and USOC ensued. Without sponsor access to the lucrative 
U.S. market, TOP would have been still-born. Samaranch and his IOC col-
leagues also understood the futility of a legal challenge to the ASA. These 
facts compelled the IOC to reach an agreement with the USOC. In 1985, 
the IOC ceded 15 percent of all revenue accrued by Samaranch’s brainchild, 
TOP, to the USOC in exchange for waiving its exclusive rights to the use of 
the logo in the United States.7 The following year, as a result of the USOC’s 
threat to prevent advertisers’ use of the Olympic rings in commercials on 
U.S. Olympic broadcasts in 1988, the IOC agreed to send $15 million to the 
USOC (an expense shared equally by the IOC and the Calgary and Seoul 
Olympic Organizing Committees), and transfer 10 percent of all future 
(1992 and beyond) U.S. Olympic television contracts to Colorado Springs, 
the site of the USOC’s headquarters and its principal training facility for 
But in delivering peace to the U.S. 
Olympic community, Washington 
politicians established a second 
theater of conflict.
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the country’s aspiring Olympians.8 This agreement was enshrined in the 
Broadcast Marketing Agreement (BMA) reached between the two bodies in 
March 1986. 
Buoyed by the legal weight of the ASA, the USOC continues to enjoy 
its singular financial status as the “Have NOC” with respect to IOC-gener-
ated revenue with its share dwarfing those allocated to the other 204 NOCs 
worldwide. Between 2005 and 2008 the USOC received $298,154,000 via 
TOP, its share of the U.S. Olympic television contracts, and television deals 
in other markets. The remaining 204 NOCs shared $393,082,000.9 
Samaranch’s presidency (1980–2001) witnessed numerous skirmishes 
between the USOC, which sought to enhance the terms of the agreements 
concerning the distribution of television and corporate sponsorship money, 
and the IOC, which resisted these overtures. The USOC pursued these 
changes in face-to-face discussions with IOC officials and through its lob-
bying efforts on Capitol Hill.10 In seeking assistance from Washington 
politicians, the USOC hoped for legislative action that would enhance its 
powers granted under the ASA. In particular, the USOC wanted the author-
ity to negotiate the U.S. television deals in order to set its share of television 
revenue without the need for IOC input. 
Jacques Rogge’s presidency (2001–present) has not been immune to 
these tensions. Currently, the USOC receives 12.75 percent of the U.S. televi-
sion contract and 20 percent of the money generated by the TOP program 
(remembering that a portion of the global sum from the program takes 
the form of VIK, or value-in-kind donations). In the past three years, the 
IOC’s European members unleashed their (verbal) arrows in an attempt to 
diminish the USOC’s share of these revenue sources, noting that one of 
the USOC’s major arguments—namely that the U.S. market provides the 
vast majority of the money—is no longer valid. European and Asian televi-
sion networks are providing increasing sums of money and have been for 
over a decade, while non-American multinational companies outnumbered 
American-based ones in support of the most recent Olympic Winter Games 
in Vancouver.11 The USOC, under the chairmanship of Peter Ueberroth, was 
unwilling to approve any proposal that would reduce the overall amount 
of money flowing to the USOC. Given that this money funds 50 percent of 
the USOC’s budget, his stance was predictable.12 
Chicago 2016, the bid committee championing the city’s pursuit of 
the 2016 Olympic Games, was caught in the crossfire between the IOC and 
USOC leading up to the final 
vote at the IOC’s Copenhagen 
Session in October 2009. Anti-
American sentiment within 
the IOC, largely whipped up 
by its European cohort who 
pressed for a reduction in the 
USOC’s share of Olympic rev-
enue, compromised Chicago’s efforts. Larry Probst, who succeeded Ueber-
roth in late 2008, agreed to engage in discussions with IOC officials com-
Anti-American sentiment within 
the IOC, largely whipped up 
by its European cohort . . . 
compromised Chicago’s efforts.
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mencing in 2013 concerning a new distribution method (to be implemented 
post-2020) when he gleaned that Chicago’s grip on the Olympic chalice had 
been loosened, in no small measure due to the ongoing conflict. It was too 
little, too late. Aided by its adept staging of the 2007 Pan-American Games, 
Rio de Janeiro’s successful bid also benefited greatly from its representa-
tives’ passionate call for the Olympics to be awarded to South America for 
the first time.13 
The IOC left a good deal of money on the table by walking away from 
what would have been an energized U.S. corporate community and an ex-
tremely competitive U.S television rights environment if Chicago prevailed. 
Chicago’s loss was also a financial blow for the USOC because its domestic 
sponsorship program would have benefited from the selection of the U.S. 
city. Furthermore, U.S. television executives would pay more for the U.S. 
Olympic television rights if the Games had been awarded to Chicago as 
opposed to any of the other finalists (Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, and Tokyo). 
This, too, would have worked in the USOC’s financial favor because of its 
percentage share of the U.S. television contract. 
Undoubtedly, one can make a solid argument from the IOC’s perspec-
tive for extending the Olympic brand to South America, and demonstrating 
regard for the ambulatory mission of the Olympic Games. However, a more 
harmonious working relationship between the IOC and USOC is in the 
best interests of the Olympic Movement. Powerbrokers within America’s 
Olympic hierarchy understand that any U.S. city’s quest to host an Olympic 
festival will founder 
on the rocks in the 
absence of a reso-
lution. Recent out-
reach efforts by the 
USOC’s new CEO, 
Scott Blackmun, and 
Larry Probst, augur 
well for a respect-
ful future dialogue 
b et we e n  t h e  t wo 
sides.14 Further con-
firmation that the 
two sides were look-
ing for common ground on revenue matters occurred in September 2010, 
when the USOC agreed to send $18 million to the IOC to solve the “games 
cost” issue in relation to the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games and 
the 2012 London Olympics.15 
Crux of the Dispute
The USOC’s case for a disproportionate share of Olympic revenue generated 
from the sale of U.S. television rights and TOP sponsorships rests largely on 
the existence of the ASA, a U.S. federal statute. With respect to Samaranch’s 
A more harmonious working relationship 
between the IOC and USOC is in the 
best interests of the Olympic Movement. 
Powerbrokers within America’s Olympic 
hierarchy understand that any U.S. city’s 
quest to host an Olympic festival will 
founder on the rocks in the absence of 
a resolution.
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plans for TOP, the USOC claimed that they encroached on its exclusive 
rights to the use of Olympic marks and emblems in the U.S. market, and 
its consent to the proposal required financial concessions from the IOC. 
USOC officials argued that the U.S.-based companies that dominated the 
prospective list of multinationals that might value the use of the Olympics 
as an international marketing platform in the mid-1980s otherwise would 
have been pursued as domestic (USOC) sponsors. This (alleged) financial 
sacrifice triggered its decision to uphold the terms of the ASA and seek 
compensation.16 
The USOC’s belief that U.S. companies would gravitate to TOP spon-
sorships proved accurate as they provided 77.8 percent of the $96 million 
raised by the program in its inaugural quadrennial (1985–1988).17 When the 
IOC agreed to the Broadcast Marketing Agreement in 1986, U.S. television 
networks, ABC and NBC respectively, provided the lion’s share of global 
television revenue (83.7 percent) for the upcoming 1988 Calgary Winter and 
Seoul Summer Olympics ($609 million of the $727.5 million global sum).18 
The IOC could neither deny its financial dependence on the U.S. market, nor 
expect any U.S. court to overturn the terms of the ASA. The USOC benefited 
greatly from the financial boost afforded by the evolution of TOP and the 
signing of the BMA. 
Over the past two decades, as the influences of globalization wrought 
major changes to the international economic order, the U.S. market’s 
percentage contribution to IOC coffers declined. For the 2009 to 2012 
quadrennial, American firms will supply 52.6 percent and 44 percent of 
the television revenue and TOP funds respectively; however, recent deals 
reached with Procter & Gamble and Dow Chemical will enhance the latter 
figure.19 IOC officials counter the USOC’s argument concerning U.S.-based 
companies’ contribution to the marketing program’s overall revenue with 
the knowledge that these businesses employ people in many countries and 
rely on revenue generated by the sale of their products around the globe. 
In a globalized economy, the TOP fees paid to the IOC also emanate from 
subsidiaries located outside the United States. At the IOC’s headquarters in 
Lausanne, Switzerland, there is resentment that the U.S. government does 
not fund a portion of the USOC’s operational budget in the fashion that 
other federal governments do for NOCs around the globe. The IOC, in this 
sense, believes it is funding 50 percent of the USOC’s budget, and considers 
this situation untenable.20 Without access to the U.S. market, USOC officials 
remind their IOC counterparts, the value of a TOP sponsorship would be 
significantly diminished—less money for everyone. Then, too, NBC has still 
been supplying over 50 percent of the sum raised from the sale of Olympic 
television rights around the globe in recent years. And so it goes. 
At this time, we wish to propose specific suggestions for the IOC and 
USOC in order to resolve their differences on the distribution of Olympic 
television and corporate sponsorship revenue, and in the process, better 
serve the needs of athletes worldwide, while further advancing the IOC’s 
commitment to social responsibility, safeguarding the financial interests 
of taxpayers in Olympic host communities, and promoting sustainability. 
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A Path to Peace
The path to peace for Olympic stakeholders requires consideration of the 
history of the IOC’s policies governing distribution of commercial revenue. 
In 1966, when the IOC passed its first formal set of guidelines for the al-
location of television revenue (known as the Rome Formula), the Olympic 
Organizing Committee (OCOG) received 66.7 percent of the money. The re-
maining 33.3 percent was apportioned equally to the IOC, NOCs, and ISFs. 
This formula applied for the first time to money from the sale of television 
rights to the 1972 Sapporo and Munich Olympic Games,21 and it served 
as the basis for the distribution of revenue through the 1994 Lillehammer 
Olympic Winter Games despite numerous (and often successful) efforts 
of OCOG leaders in the 1970s and 1980s to further enhance their shares 
of the revenue pie.22 In response to these machinations, the IOC assumed 
an increasingly greater profile in the negotiations with television network 
representatives in the 1980s in order to prevent the OCOGs from signing 
contracts detrimental to the IOC’s financial interests.23 The IOC established 
a new distribution policy in advance of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics with 60 
percent granted to the OCOG, and 40 percent directed to the IOC and its 
Olympic family partners, a practice that continued through the 2002 Salt 
Lake City Olympic Winter Games. 
In 1995, Samaranch successfully championed a move to further en-
hance the amount of money flowing to Olympic organizations. His plan to 
reduce an OCOG’s share of television money to 49 percent (down from 60 
percent), and increase the Olympic Movement’s share to 51 percent (up from 
40 percent) was challenged within the Executive Board by senior IOC mem-
bers, Richard Pound, Anita DeFrantz, and Kevan Gosper. “An important 
contribution to public sympathy for the Games,” stated Pound, the long-
time chief negotiator of Olympic television deals in the U.S. and beyond, 
“lay in the IOC’s being able to say that most of the revenue went towards 
organizing the Games.” Paring the OCOG’s share “was neither necessary 
nor popular,” he continued, and should not be undertaken “unless a need 
for more revenue within the Olympic family could be demonstrated.” In 
addition, he warned that if the IOC’s share of television revenue increased, 
the IOC could expect an approach from the USOC for an increase on its 
current ten percent share.24 Anita DeFrantz labeled a decision to limit an 
OCOG’s portion to 49 percent, “a punitive gesture.”25 Gosper did not like 
the optics of increasing the Olympic Movement’s share so quickly after the 
most recent change in advance of the Atlanta Olympics or moving past the 
50 percent line.26 
Samaranch clearly wanted to distribute more money to the NOCs and 
ISFs. He knew that the time to move forward with this change, to come into 
effect for the 2004 Olympics, was in 1995 or 1996 while the 2004 bid cities 
were actively seeking the right to host the Games. They were far less likely to 
voice any opposition when attempting to court the IOC’s favor than after a 
site had been selected in 1997.27 Holland’s Pál Schmitt backed Samaranch’s 
plan to increase the amounts flowing to the ISFs and NOCs, as did fellow 
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Executive Board member, Ashwini Kumar of India. Alexandre de Merode of 
Belgium supported Samaranch’s proposal stating that the IOC’s expenses 
might increase in the future if athletes demanded money for their participa-
tion in the Olympics. Samaranch’s victory was not a resounding one, as the 
motion passed by a vote of 5-4 with 1 abstention.28 When François Carrard, 
the IOC’s Director General, asked the group whether he should announce 
the change at the upcoming lunchtime press briefing, a clearly displeased 
Pound offered that “if the Executive Board was proud of its decision, it 
should announce it straightaway.”29
When the IOC leadership sold this change in the public forum, one of 
the principal supporting arguments was that the OCOG’s diminished share 
of television revenue was offset by the increasing sums available from the 
TOP program. Our position on the future distribution of television revenue 
(in terms of the percentage share directed to the OCOGs) falls closer to the 
opinion voiced by Richard Pound, when the IOC pondered the change in 
September 1995. It is the OCOG and the host community that must stage 
an Olympic festival and who bear the responsibility for ensuring that the 
Games are well organized, complete with the facilities, transportation plan, 
required accommodations, and necessary security. We are unconvinced that 
the ISFs require the substantial sums flowing to them in the wake of the 
2004 Athens Olympics. The ISFs are not required to abandon staging their 
World Championships in an Olympic year, although this was an action 
some took in the past, and therefore can not claim an inability to generate 
their own revenue in an Olympic year as a justification for the receipt of 
Olympic-generated money. In the 2005–2008 quadrennial, over $420 mil-
lion was distributed to the ISFs governing sports on the Olympic Winter 
and Olympic programs.30 We are more sympathetic to the needs of the 
NOCs who must feed, clothe, and transport their athletes who participate 
in Olympic Games, and spearhead the promotion of the Olympic Move-
ment and its values in their respective countries.31 At the close of 2009, the 
IOC’s reserve fund rested at $466 million. The organization is in a position 
to re-direct some of its share of Olympic revenue to other entities. Admit-
tedly, until the IOC witnesses a decline in the number of cities willing to 
accept the financial risk of hosting the Games under the current distribution 
method for television and corporate sponsorship revenue, the IOC’s senior 
leadership likely lacks the motivation to reduce the amount of money that 
the members of the Olympic family receive.32 Samaranch hoped that the 
enhanced revenues would empower the NOCs and ISFs to further develop 
sport in a global context, but it cannot be ignored that when money flows, 
good feelings follow, and this also fueled Samaranch’s use of money to assist 
in maintaining good relations with the ISFs and NOCs in the latter years 
of his presidency. 
Our prescription for change favors the interests of the OCOGs and 
challenges leaders in the Olympic Tripartite (the IOC, NOCs, including the 
USOC, and ISFs) to act in the best interests of Olympic athletes and the 
communities that accept the daunting task of hosting an Olympic Games. 
While they will likely not be popular, at first glance, among many of those 
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affiliated with the IOC, NOCs, and ISFs, all of whom experience a drop in 
their shares of Olympic revenue under the plan, our proposals are designed 
to prompt a meaningful and 
necessary discussion in which all 
of the aforementioned agencies 
justify the large sums of money 
channeled to them. 
Television Dollars
When the IOC Executive Board, 
at Samaranch’s urging, altered 
the method of distributing tele-
vision revenue from the 60/40 
(OCOG/Olympic Movement) 
split to the 51/49 (Olympic 
Movement/OCOG) formula, the USOC pushed for a larger share than the 
10 percent of the U.S. contract it had received since the establishment of the 
Broadcast Marketing Agreement. Beginning with the 2004 Athens games, 
the two sides agreed to divide the money from the U.S. television contract 
into five portions: 49 percent for the OCOG and equal shares of 12.75 per-
cent to the IOC, NOCs, ISFs, and USOC. All non-U.S. television contracts 
adhered to the 51/49 distribution formula; however, it should be noted that 
the USOC did not receive a direct share from this revenue source. This plan 
remained in effect through the Turin/Beijing (2005–2008) quadrennial. 
Today, the USOC maintains its 12.75 percent share of the U.S. televi-
sion contract, while the IOC Executive Board determines the distribution 
of the remaining portion of the Olympic Movement’s share of the U.S. and 
non-U.S. television contracts following negotiations with the NOCs and 
ISFs. The OCOGs in the current (Vancouver and London) and subsequent 
quadrennials (Sochi and Rio) receive what is termed an “IOC Contribution” 
in real U.S. dollars that does not have a direct percentage link to television 
revenue from the U.S. or non-U.S. television contracts. It seems that OCOGs 
now work under the assumption that they will not receive less in terms of 
this “IOC Contribution” than the preceding OCOG, that there may not 
necessarily share in any increases in revenue derived from the sale of Olym-
pic television rights. Our preference is that the IOC employs a distribution 
formula with defined percentages, if for no other reason than transparency, 
and as a result, our proposals will use the former distribution plan as a base 
(Table 1). 
We support a move to a 55/45 (OCOG/Olympic Movement) split, with 
a share of 11.25 percent flowing to the USOC, and 33.75 percent distributed 
among the ISFs, NOCs, and IOC. We propose to reduce the debt faced by 
many host communities by enhancing the funds available to the OCOGs 
from television revenue, in addition to financial support from TOP. The 
same 55/45 split would apply to all non-U.S. television contracts with the 
IOC, ISFs, and NOCs, sharing the Olympic Movement portion as per the 
current negotiations process; however, we advise that the NOCs’ share not 
Our prescription for change 
. . . challenges leaders in the 
Olympic Tripartite . . . to act 
in the best interests of Olympic 
athletes and the communities 
that accept the daunting task of 
hosting an Olympic Games. 
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be reduced. If the USOC seeks to supplement its revenue in light of these 
reductions, it should approach its federal government, as do other NOCs, 
or ramp up its own domestic sponsorship efforts.33 
TOP Dollars
Currently, half of the TOP revenue in any quadrennial is directed towards 
the Winter and Summer Organizing Committees (OCOGs), and the NOCs 
(forty percent) and the IOC (ten percent) receive the remaining half. Solv-
ing the IOC/USOC dispute must not deduct from funds earmarked for the 
OCOGs. Their fifty percent share remains sacrosanct, and we advise an eight 
percent augmentation for the establishment of an Olympic Facilities Man-
agement Agency (OFMA), which would ensure that Olympic facilities serve 
as temporary, but world-class, training facilities for aspiring Olympians as 
well as a breeding ground for coaches. This legacy plan should be instituted 
for a minimum of three years and would need to be thoroughly outlined 
during the original bid process. The NOCs and each OFMA would also need 
to establish cost-sharing plans for accommodations for those travelling to 
the site following the close of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Many 
bids revolve around the idea that an Olympic Village serve as a source of 
low-income housing for the host community after an Olympic festival. We 
do not seek to alter the mindset of bid committees concerning the merit of 
this type of initiative, but we suggest perhaps twenty percent of the Olympic 
Village be diverted to housing visiting athletes and coaches for a three-year 
period as a critical element in maintaining the functionality of a world class 
training facility. The OFMA could also make use of this accommodation 
space as a youth hostel when not housing aspiring Olympians, as a source 
of additional revenue. To assist in the generation of local jobs, people living 
within the low-cost housing community could be employed as members of 
the cleaning and maintenance staff of the portion of the Olympic Village 
retained as an element of the athletic training infrastructure. 
The additional eight percent directed at the OCOGs also has ramifica-
tions for the IOC and USOC: the IOC, cushioned by its $466 million reserve, 
would accept a 7 percent share, the NOCs would still receive 20 percent, 
and the USOC’s share would fall to 15 percent. This reduction returns the 
USOC’s share to what it had been at the time of the program’s inception, 
but still provides the USOC with a sizeable contribution, recognizes the 
financial contribution of the U.S. market and the ASA, and maintains the 
USOC in a revenue-sharing position not enjoyed by any of the world’s other 
204 NOCs. With a 15 percent share of TOP revenue and an 11.25 percent 
share of the U.S. television contract, not to mention its share of the tele-
vision money sent to the NOCs through Olympic Solidarity, the USOC 
maintains its privileged position.34
TOP Sustainability Partner: A New Initiative
In addition to suggesting reformed strategies for the distribution of televi-
sion contract and TOP revenue, our “path to peace” proposal includes the 
creation of a new sponsor category: the TOP Sustainability Partner. TOP 
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  Turin/Beijing Percent Share   Proposed Percent Share
  OCOG   IOC   ISFs   NOCs   USOC      OCOG   IOC   ISFs   NOCs   USOC
US Television 49 38.25   12.75 55 33.75   11.25
Non US Television 49 51   0i 55 45ii   0a
TOP Revenueiii 50 10 0 20 20 58 7 0 20 15
i While not receiving a dedicated share of the non-U.S. television money, the USOC does 
receive a share of money, as do the other 204 NOCs, from the NOCs’ portion of the 51 percent 
share for the Olympic Movement transferred through the Olympic Solidarity Program.
ii Despite the reduction in the Olympic Movement’s share of non-U.S. television revenue from 
51 percent to 45 percent, we propose the percentage of money directed to the NOCs remain 
constant.
iii The “Turin/Beijing Percent Share” formula for TOP Revenue, which is still used today, is 
employed for the distribution of contributions of the majority of TOP sponsors. For a limited 
number, based on product category, some modifications are made.
Table 1. Turin-Beijing and Proposed Formulas  
for Distribution of Television and TOP Revenue
Sustainability Partner initiatives aim to make a difference in the social, eco-
nomic, and athletic development of disadvantaged regions around the world 
by capitalizing on the Olympic Movement’s global presence, supporting the 
IOC’s stated commitment to enhancing sport as a tool for the improvement 
of social and human well-being,35 and addressing ongoing criticisms of the 
IOC and its dearth of social responsiblity initiatives.
Unlike traditional TOP sponsors, corporations vying for TOP Sustain-
ability Partner status would submit proposals for a specified sustainability 
project addressing the UN Millennium Development Goals. These propos-
als would be equal in dollar worth to traditional TOP sponsors—currently 
around $100 million—and 55–65 percent of total funds would go establish-
ing a project in a developing nation.36 For example, programs could include 
building clean-water facilities, erecting hospitals or clinics dedicated to 
child and maternal health, or retrofitting factories to reverse the loss of 
environmental resources. 
Rather than compete for TOP Sponsor status against other corpora-
tions within existing product or service categories (such as Coca Cola versus 
Pepsi Cola or Visa versus American Express), TOP Sustainability Partner 
applicants may come from any product or service category not already rep-
resented by current TOP Sponsors. For instance, the current TOP Sponsor 
list37 does not include a sporting apparel company, leaving the TOP Sustain-
ability Partner category open to companies such as Nike, Adidas, or Reebok 
to submit proposals. Members of the IOC marketing commission, UN global 
sustainability consultancies, and other governmental and non-governmental 
institutions38 would comprise a bilateral commission that chooses, upon 
IOC Executive Board appproval, the successful TOP Sustainability Partners. 
Additionally, this committee would complete a semi-annual review of the 
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state of on-going projects and the status of completed facilities in order to 
exhibit a sound monitoring practice for the fund. 
The remaining 35 percent to 45 percent from the successful TOP 
Sustainability Partner’s proposition would be earmarked to provide as-
sistance to aspiring Olympians in financial need, as well as making funds 
available to help developing nations enhance their sport infrastructure. The 
IOC would create two separate funds by equally splitting the remaining 
35 to 45 percent (approximately $35 to 45 million, based on current TOP 
Sponsorship commitments). NOCs from developing nations could apply 
for support from one fund managed in Lausanne by IOC staff members to 
financially assist in clearly defined sporting infrastructure projects, such as 
stadia and training facilities. A special committee comprised of one active 
NOC representative nominated from each continent (and approved by the 
Association of Olympic Committees), as well as an ad hoc group from the 
current IOC Executive Board, including the Chairman of Olympic Solidarity 
and at minimum three other members of the Olympic Solidarity Commis-
sion, would decide which projects receive funding. NOCs that receive funds 
would be required to submit quarterly project reports until the construction 
phase of any project has concluded, complete with financial records, and 
semi-annual reports thereafter on the function of the facility in question 
for a period of five years.
The second fund, similarly controlled and managed by IOC person-
nel in Lausanne, would provide a reserve from which athletes can apply for 
need-based bursaries to offset clearly articulated training, equipment, or 
ancillary support costs. For instance, an Indonesian pole vaulter may apply 
for funds to cover expenses for a new carbon fiber pole, three weeks of expert 
coaching hosted at an Indonesian track and field facility, and training for 
two weeks at one of the proposed Olympic “legacy” sites. A committee con-
sisting of an NOC representative from each continent as well as the existing 
IOC Athletes’ Commission—a body comprised of athletes elected by fellow 
Olympians—would adjudicate the athlete bursary applications.
Summary
Our purpose in advancing these proposals concerning modifications to 
means employed to both distribute and generate Olympic revenue is mul-
tifold. First and foremost, we believe that the IOC and USOC must form a 
true partnership that resolves the current dispute and recognizes that the 
Olympic Movement is stronger when their mutual interests are served. Also, 
we sought to contribute to this dialogue. Second, we assert that impend-
ing discussions between the IOC and the USOC offer stakeholders in the 
Olympic Movement an important opportunity to reflect on issues extending 
well beyond the microcosmic situation involving Lausanne and Colorado 
Springs. Central among these issues is our belief that a greater proportion 
of the money generated from television rights sales and corporate sponsor-
ship should be transferred to OCOGs. In addition, the ambulatory mission 
of the Games, while laudable, has created too many “white elephant” stadia 
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and their potential benefits in terms of athlete development are not realized. 
Hence, we propose the development of a formalized three-year legacy plan 
for the use of Olympic facilities to support aspiring Olympians from around 
the globe. This plan would afford host cities (and their business communi-
ties) additional streams of revenue while athletes, coaches, and support staff 
visited for training purposes, not to mention the visitors and spectators 
who would spend money in the communities for any competitions (exhibi-
tion tournaments, regional or world championships) staged at the former 
Olympic facilities during the three-year period following the conclusion 
of the Games. Fourth, can this wider dialogue concerning the generation 
and distribution of Olympic revenue provide an opportunity for the IOC 
to augment its commitment to sustainability and social responsibility? We 
believe so, and this is why we have proposed the development of the TOP 
Sustainability Partners for companies seeking a hybrid sponsorship that 
would elevate their profile within the elite athlete and sport development 
domain (bursary program for athletes in need) as well as the developing 
world (NOC support), thus demonstrating their commitment to social re-
sponsibility (major infrastructural project in the developing world). 
It is clear from the recent efforts of IOC officials and USOC represen-
tatives to open dialogue on the “games cost” issue that the possibility for a 
new era in terms of communication and trust between the two bodies is real. 
Their respective leaders deserve plaudits for making this happen. We believe 
that the next round of discussions concerning the USOC’s share of Olympic 
revenue from television rights and corporate sponsorship offers avenues of 
discussion beyond the terms of their future financial relationship and that 
those same avenues of discussion provide means for the Olympic Movement 
to address the worthy goals of social responsibility and sustainability. 
Notes
1 Nancy Scannell, “New Bodies Suggested for USOC; Restructuring of USOC Recom-
mended,” Washington Post, January 13, 1977, p. D1; and, Nancy Scannell, “AAU-NCAA 
Conflict Nears Conclusion – Commentary,” Washington Post, June 25, 1978, p. E7. Both 
articles were located through the LexisNexis search engine. See also, John T. Woolley and 
Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA., http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23939 [January 11, 2010]. U.S. President Gerald Ford estab-
lished the President’s Commission on Olympic Sports (PCOS) through Executive Order 
11868 in 1975. The PCOS filed its 613-page, two volume antidote for what ailed the USOC 
and compromised the country’s performance on the international sport stage in January 
1977. These suggestions formed the basis of the changes outlined in the Amateur Sports 
Act signed by President Jimmy Carter in November 1978. For more on the Amateur Sports 
Act, see Thomas M. Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympics Medals Race: 
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 and American Athletics Policy Reform,” The International 
Journal of the History of Sport 24 (2007): 796–818.
2 Eddie Pells, “USOC Still Looking for Answers in the Wake of Chicago’s Embarrassment in 
Vote for 2016 Olympics,” October 3, 2009, http://blog.taragana.com/sports/2009/10/03/
usoc-still-looking-for-answers-in-wake-of-chicagos-embarrassment-in-vote-for-2016-olym-
pics-34010/ [March 29, 2010]. Scott Blackmun is the USOC’s seventh full-time or interim 
CEO since 2000. For an assessment of the challenges facing Blackmun who was hired in 
January 2010, see Bill Briggs, “USOC Struggles to Polish its Tarnished Image,” msnbc.com, 
February 10, 2010, http://msnbc,msn.com/id/35147038/ [August 20, 2010].
130 SAIS Review    WinTeR–spRing 2011
3 Changes enacted in the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act reflected the need 
to attend to a number of issues including the demise of amateurism, the USOC’s responsi-
bilities concerning the Paralympic Games, as well as a desire to improve athlete representa-
tion. 
4 For a complete text of the Amateur Sports Act, see, Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95–606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978). Anne Wall provided an interesting analysis of the power 
of the Olympic rings to generate revenue in the context of Salt Lake City’s domestic spon-
sorship program, as well as the efforts of the USOC and Salt Lake organizers to protect 
their corporate sponsors from ambush marketing campaigns. See Anne M. Wall, “The Game 
Behind the Games,” Marquette Sports Law Review 12 (Spring, 2002): 557–581. Interestingly, 
Congressional action in 1978 reconfirmed powers already granted to the United States 
Olympic Association in 1950 at the time of its incorporation with respect to ownership of 
its then-shield logo and the Olympic rings. See United States Statutes at Large, 1950–1951, 
vol. 64, Part I: Public Laws and Reorganization Plans (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1952), 901.
5 These efforts were largely unsuccessful. A mere twenty-two countries signed WIPO’s Nairobi 
Treaty to protect the Olympic emblem in the early 1980s. The U.S. representative at WIPO’s 
Nairobi’s conference did not sign the Treaty, and provided no explanation. Undoubtedly, the 
individual was aware of the conflict that would have been established with the pre-existing 
terms of the ASA. The logo’s use in the public domain commenced in December, 1987, 
fifty years after Pierre de Coubertin’s death. Coubertin designed the logo in 1913. The IOC 
considered establishing a new logo, but relied instead on internal copyright protections 
pursued by individual NOCs. Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, 
Selling the Five Rings: The IOC and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism (Salt Lake City: University 
of Utah Press, rev. ed. 2004), 156–163.
6 A detailed analysis of this issue can be found in, Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five 
Rings, 168–180, 211–213, 225–226, 243–265, 267–277.
7 “IOC/ISL Meeting,” May 14, 1985, Lausanne, “ISL Union with IOC” File; and, Minutes of 
the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, May 28, 1985, pp. 177–178, Interna-
tional Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland [hereafter cited as IOCA]. For 
a discussion of events, see Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, 172–175.
8 Richard Pound (Chair, IOC Television Rights Negotiations Commission) to Juan Antonio 
Samaranch (IOC President), September 26, 1985; and, Richard Pound to Juan Antonio 
Samaranch, September 30, 1985, “Seoul 1988 TV-General II” File, IOCA. For the USOC’s 
view, see George D. Miller (Secretary General, USOC) to Roone Arledge (President, ABC 
Sports), October 29, 1985, “Calgary 1988 TV-General” File, IOCA. The deliberations of the 
IOC Executive Board can be found in Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, 
Lausanne, February 11–12, 1986, pp. 5–7; and, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive 
Board, Seoul, April 22–24, 1986, pp. 4–5, IOCA.
9 IOC Reference Service, e-mail message to Stephen Wenn, January 14, 2010.
10 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, 243–265. 
11 Philip Hersh, “IOC Official Rips USOC’s Share of Olympic Funding,” Chicago Tribune, June 
3, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/chi-us-olympic-revenues-share,0,1220316.
story [September 28, 2008]; “IOC, USOC to Revisit Olympic Revenue Sharing,” CBSSports.
com, June 4, 2008, http://sportsline.com/worldsports/story/10852373 [September 28, 
2008]; and, “Dispute over Olympic Revenue Sharing May Impact Chicago Bid,” USA Today, 
June 3, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-06-03-chicago-share_N.htm 
[September 28, 2008].
12 Hersh, “IOC Official Rips USOC’s Share of Olympic Funding”; and, “Ueberroth: U.S. 
Business Drives Olympic Financial Engine,” October 11, 2008, http://universalsports.com/
news/article/newsid=301894.html [August 18, 2010].
13 For an interesting in-the-moment analysis, see John Goodbody, “Rio de Janeiro Takes the 
World by Storm,” The Sunday Times, October 4, 2009, http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/
olympics/article6860138.ece [August 18, 2010]. Wenn placed Chicago’s collapse in the wider 
context of IOC/USOC relations in, Stephen R. Wenn, “IOC/USOC Relations and the 2009 
IOC Session in Copenhagen,” in Robert K. Barney, Janice Forsyth, and Michael Heine, eds., 
131ThoughTs on olympic Revenue and The ioc/usoc divide
Rethinking Matters Olympic: Investigations into the Socio-Cultural Study of the Modern 
Olympic Movement: Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium for Olympic Re-
search (London, Ontario: International Centre for Olympic Studies, 2010), pp. 60–75. 
14 Alan Abrahamson, “Scott Blackmun: Arguably the USOC’s last best chance,” UniversalSports.
com, January 6, 2010, http://www.universalsports.com/blogs/blog=alanabrahamsonsblog/
postid=387006.html [January 15, 2010]; and, Stephen Wilson, “IOC and USOC look to 
resolve financial issue,” USA Today, April 27, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
olympics/2010-04-27-2872487469_x.htm [May 2, 2010]. Peter Ueberroth’s successor as 
Chairman of the USOC, Larry Probst, has also expended significant energies recently in 
an attempt to effect repair to IOC/USOC relations. Tripp Mickle, “Probst on USOC-IOC 
Relations: Time to Walk the Walk,” February 11, 2010, http;//sportsbusinessdaily.com/
wintergames/entries/2010/Probst-on-usoc-ioc-relations-time-to-walk-the-walk [August 
18, 2010]; and, Brian Gomez, “USOC Chair traveling the globe, mending ties with IOC,” 
Colorado Springs Gazette, June 29, 2010, http://www.gazette.com/articles/usocchairman-
travelingtheglobe-100995-mendingtieswithioc-.html [September 15, 2010].
15 All NOCs, with the exception of the USOC, had contributed in the past to a fund that 
helped defray costs of the operation of a number of IOC commissions, anti-doping opera-
tions, and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. This resolution advances the timeline for 
the opening of discussions on the larger matter of Olympic revenue distribution before 
the planned date (2013) for the commencement of talks. “USOC and IOC reach agreement 
in financial dispute,” USA Today, September 9, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
Olympics/2010-09-09-usoc-ioc-agreement_Nhtm [September 13, 2010]. 
16 This leverage point for the USOC has lost a good measure of its weight in the ensu-
ing years. A large U.S. multinational with designs on expanding its reach within a global 
economy would by no means see significant value in an Olympic sponsorship platform if 
limited to its use in the U.S. market alone. There seems less support today for the USOC’s 
position that a U.S. company by default would pursue a USOC sponsorship in the absence 
of the TOP program that operates on a global basis. 
17 Tripp Mickle, “IOC Shifts from Dependence on U.S. Revenue, Street & Smith’s Sports-
Business Journal, October 12, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/63810 
[April 15, 2010].
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid; “IOC Officially Announces Dow Sponsorship Deal,” July 17, 2010, http://www.olym-
pics-now.com/2010/07/17/ioc-officially-announces-dow-sponsorship-deal [August 18, 2010]; 
and, “IOC Announces Sponsorship Deal with Consumer Products Giant Procter & Gamble,” 
YAHOO! News Canada, July 28, 2010, http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/100728/busi-
ness/oly_ioc_sponsor [July 28, 2010].
20 The point-counterpoint argument is captured well by Philip Hersh in his Globetrotting 
blog posted to chicagotribune.com on July 8, 2009. The blog focused on Hersh’s e-mail 
exchange with Hein Verbruggen, one of the IOC members tasked by IOC President Jacques 
Rogge to conclude an agreement with the USOC, and one of the more strident Europe-
ans seeking a reduction in the USOC’s share of IOC-generated commercial revenue. See 
Philip Hersh, “Verbruggen on IOC-USOC Money Flap: Never a Serious Proposition from 
USOC,” chicagotribune.com, July 8, 2009, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/sports_
globetrotting/2009/07by-philip-hersh-over-the-past-several-months-I-have-written-several-
blogs-about-the-ongoing-revenue-sharing-dispute-between.html [August 18, 2010].
21 For the development of the Rome Formula and IOC President Avery Brundage’s hopes that 
such a formula would satisfy the NOCs, ISFs, and OCOGs, all of whom lobbied for large 
shares of the television revenue in the 1960s, see Stephen R. Wenn, “An Olympian Squabble: 
The Distribution of Olympic Television Revenue, 1960-1966,” Olympika: The International 
Journal of Olympic Studies III (1994): 27–47.
22 For instance, Willi Daume, President of the Munich OCOG, signed a deal for U.S. televi-
sion rights with the American Broadcasting Company for $13.5 million. However, at this 
time, the OCOGs negotiated the contracts and the IOC merely approved them. Daume 
inserted a clause that classified $6 million of this total as a technical services fee payable 
directly to the OCOG. Hence, the contract set $7.5 million as the rights fee divisible accord-
132 SAIS Review    WinTeR–spRing 2011
ing to the Rome Formula. Daume’s move resulted in a standoff, but the IOC eventually 
acquiesced when Munich agreed that a technical services fee could be included only in the 
contract for the U.S. market. The IOC was neither in a position to transfer the Games to 
another city nor withstand a lengthy impasse because of its dependence on the receipt of 
a share of the U.S. contract to fund its operations. See Stephen R. Wenn, “Growing Pains: 
The Olympic Movement and Television, 1966–1972,” Olympika: The International Journal of 
Olympic Studies IV (1995): 1–22. 
23 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, 103–150, 181–202.
24 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne September, 24–26, 1995, 
pp. 45–46, IOCA. On this assertion, Pound proved prescient as the USOC was quick to 
lobby for more money. When they USOC met resistance, Colorado Springs officials took 
their case to Washington in search of support from Congressional allies. They wanted 
law makers on Capitol Hill to decree that U.S. television contracts should be negotiated 
by the USOC, which could then establish its own share of the money independent of the 
IOC’s input. The USOC had launched a similar campaign in 1990 through Representative 
Tom McMillen (D - Maryland), but Pound headed off further legislative action through a 
personal meeting with McMillen in Washington in January, 1991. It should be noted that 
the change in the IOC’s share was only one of the drivers behind the USOC’s campaign on 
Capitol Hill in 1996. In 1995, USOC officials were angered by the IOC’s pursuit of long-term 
U.S. television rights agreements with NBC for 2000/2002 and 2004/2006/2008 while the 
USOC was still limited to a 10 percent share. In 1996, Samaranch had been willing to move 
as high as 15 percent for the USOC, but he was angered by news of the lobbying efforts 
of USOC officials on Capitol Hill. He chastised USOC leaders at an IOC/USOC Summit 
in Cancún, Mexico in October, 1996, and he informed USOC representatives that he was 
prepared to move forward without the USOC. This could only have been a veiled threat 
given the financial realities of the U.S. market for the Olympic Movement, and cooler heads 
prevailed. This skirmish resulted in the bilateral agreement that the USOC’s share would 
increase to 12.75 percent for the 2004 Olympics and beyond. The former distribution plan 
permitted the USOC access to 10 percent of the U.S. television contract, with the members 
of the Olympic Tripartite (IOC, ISFs, and NOCs) sharing 30 percent. The OCOG received 
the majority share, 60 percent. Once the IOC Executive Board approved the shift to a 51 
percent share for the Olympic Movement, the USOC, as noted, looked for an increase to its 
10 percent share. Richard Pound proposed the 12.75 percent solution as it would maintain 
the USOC’s one-quarter share of money dedicated to members of the Olympic Movement, 
but not sacrifice (from an IOC perspective) the additional 2.25 percent that Samaranch had 
been willing to concede to the USOC. Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, 
262–265; and, Richard Pound, e-mail message to Stephen Wenn, September 25, 2010. 
25 Ibid., p. 46.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 45.
28 Ibid., p. 46.
29 Ibid., p. 47.
30 2010 Olympic Marketing Fact File (IOC: Lausanne, 2010), 9. One must wonder why, for 
instance, an OCOG must still pay for the transportation, accommodation, and uniforms 
for judges, referees, and technical officials at an Olympic festival and why that expense does 
not fall to the individual sport governing bodies given the money flowing to their respec-
tive coffers. The OCOG, at its expense, must also provide the ISFs with “the premises and 
facilities necessary for processing matters of a technical matter.” These policies are aspects 
of By-law to Rule 47 and By-law to Rule 41 of the Olympic Charter. IOC Reference Service, 
e-mail message to Stephen Wenn, September 8, 2010. Summer ISFs participating in Barce-
lona (1992) shared $37.6 million, while those participating in Beijing shared $295 million. 
Winter ISFs participating in Albertville shared $17 million, while those operating in Turin 
(2006) split $126 million. These data reveal a 7.8- and 7.4-fold increase respectively. 
31 It should be noted that the cost of transporting athletes has been borne by OCOGs on 
occasion in the past when such remuneration has been used as an element of a city’s bid as 
a means of garnering support.
133ThoughTs on olympic Revenue and The ioc/usoc divide
32 A proactive approach to revenue distribution whereby the OCOG share of revenue is 
enhanced might have important tangible benefits beyond what we suggest, namely the ex-
tended use of Olympic competition venues. The IOC hardly wants to revisit a time in which 
the number of bid cities dwindles. In the 1970s and 1980s, this circumstance resulted from 
bid city wariness as a result of world geopolitics, the hazards of the boycott era, and the 
prospect for crushing debt (witness Montreal, 1976). We see our suggestion to elevate the 
OCOG share of Olympic television and corporate sponsorship money as a wise ‘stimulus 
plan’ to offset any chilling effect on future bids resulting from the challenges faced by nu-
merous economies in the new global order. 
33 Admittedly, this assertion poses a significant challenge to the history and tradition of 
U.S. government practice concerning public money and USOC funding. And, the USOC 
appreciates its ability to conduct its affairs in the absence of government money as it aids 
in the maintenance of its operational autonomy. Still, it is an argument that receives little 
hearing in Europe or other regions of the Olympic world.
34 In the 1980s, one of the contributing factors leading to the original IOC/USOC agree-
ments concerning revenue had to do with the threat of a Washington-imposed Olympic tax 
on U.S. money directed to Lausanne for distribution throughout the Olympic Movement. 
The IOC believed it was better to pursue agreements with the USOC in which it had some 
control on the amount of money flowing to the USOC, as opposed to a U.S. federal tax 
which could be adjusted by Congress over time, likely to the IOC’s detriment.
35 Evidence for the merit of this proposal can be found in the IOC’s own literature. See 
“Young People at the Heart of the Forum on Sport, Peace and Development,” Olympic.org, 
April 24, 2009, http://www.olympic.org/media?articleid=72369 [January 14, 2011].
36 The Millennium Development Goals were established by the United Nations in 2000 to 
address major issues facing developing nations by 2015. The eight Millennium Goals include 
ending poverty and hunger, providing universal education, championing gender equity, 
enhancing child and maternal health, combating AIDS/HIV, promoting environmental 
sustainability, and establishing global partnerships for development.
37 Currently, the eleven TOP Sponsors include (category in parentheses) Coca Cola (non-
alcoholic beverage), Acer (computing equipment), Atos Origin (IT/communications), Dow 
Chemical (chemistry), GE (electronics), McDonalds (retail food), Omega (time pieces), 
Panasonic (audio/TV/video), Proctor & Gamble (personal care/household items), Samsung 
(wireless communication), and Visa (consumer payment).
38 Such a commission might follow the composition model set by the IOC when it estab-
lished the Ethics Commission in wake of the Salt Lake City bid scandal that invites signifi-
cant contribution from non-IOC members (for an extended analysis, see Wenn, Barney and 
Martyn, Tarnished Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Salt Lake City 
Bid Scandal). This commission, as with the IOC Ethics Commission, would be chaired by 
a non-IOC member.
